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Abstract
In this paper we examine trends in the cross-sectional wealth distribution. We use two wealth
definitions: net worth and financial wealth. We use data from the Socio-Economic Panel, a
representative panel survey conducted by Statistics Netherlands. First, we describe the information
on wealth available in the SEP, and the problems with person- and item-non response. Moreover,
we compare the SEP data with an external data source, the Income Panel Survey (IPS).  The IPS  has
been constructed from administrative records (e.g. records from the wealth and income tax). We then
analyze the trends in wealth inequality (the cross-sectional distribution of wealth), and in the age and
income gradient of wealth holdings. Finally, we consider shortly some explanations for the observed
pattern of wealth accumulation in the Netherlands. We especially focus on saving motive data which
are available in the SEP.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we examine trends in the cross-sectional wealth distribution. We use two wealth
definitions: net worth and financial wealth. We use data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP),
a representative panel survey conducted by Statistics Netherlands. The SEP contains detailed
information about household characteristics, income, and wealth. It follows households over time,
enabling the researcher to gain greater insight into their behavior. The fact that wealth data is
collected every year is a feature of the SEP, which is not shared by many other data sets. For
example, the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics reports data on wealth in 1984,1989  and 1994,
while the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) collects wealth data in a three-year interval. In
addition, the SEP provides some valuable information on subjective income expectations and
motives to save. This information allows for a very careful examination of household behavior and,
in addition, it provides researchers with some instruments to account for measurement error
problems.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the information on wealth
available in the SEP, and the problems with person- and item-nonresponse. Moreover, we
compare the SEP data with an external data source, the Income Panel Survey (IPS). The IPS  has
been constructed from administrative records (e.g. records from wealth and income tax records).
In section 3, we analyze the trends in wealth inequality (the cross-sectional distribution of
wealth). Section 4 discusses trends in the age and income gradient of wealth holdings. Finally
in section 5 we consider briefly some explanations for the observed pattern of wealth
accumulation in the Netherlands, focusing especially on saving motive data available in the SEP.
2. The Socio-Economic Panel
The SEP covers approximately 5,000 households. The purpose of the SEP, as summarized in
Statistics Netherlands publications (see, for example, Statistics Netherlands (1991)),  is to provide
a description of the most important elements of individual and household welfare and to monitor
changes in these elements. The survey is representative of the Dutch population, excluding those
living in special institutions like nursing homes. In order to tive at a representative sample,
Statistics Netherlands applies a stratified sampling procedure. In the first step, municipalities are
drawn with probabilities depending on the number of inhabitants (the four biggest cities are drawn
with certainty). In the second step, addresses are selected randomly. All households present at the 0
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selected address are interviewed, up to a maximum of three households. In contrast to the
American Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) wealthy households are not oversampled (see e.g.
Avery, Elliehausen and Kennickell(l988) for more information about the SCF). Moreover, the
SEP does not have a low-income supplement, as is the case with the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). The SEP has been launched in April 1984. The same households were
interviewed in October 1984 and then twice a year (in April and October) until 1989. Since 1990
the survey has been conducted once a year in May. In order to address the problem of sample
attrition, Statistics Netherlands regularly adds new households to the SEP.
In the October interview, information is collected on socio-economic characteristics, income
and labor market participation.’ The April interviews collect information about socio-economic
characteristics, as in the October interview, but rather than gathering data about income, from
1987 onwards the April questionnaire includes questions on a wide range of assets and liabilities.
A useful feature of the SEP set is the provision of variables such as households’ expectations
about the behavior of income in the future and the motives for saving. This information provides
an additional check on the consistency of the data and enables a more detailed assessment of models
of household behavior. In addition, these variables can act as instruments for both savings and
income changes. A less attractive feature of the SEP is that it contains hardly any infomation  about
the health status of the respondents. Only the 1994 wave of the SEP includes a subjective question
about health status. Obviously, health information is very relevant for empirical investigations into
the retirement choice and the wealth holdings of the elderly.
Every respondent (i.e., a person who is at least 16 years old) in the household has to complete
a rather short questionnaire on assets and liabilities.2 In the SEP questionnaire, a distinction is
’ Alessie and Kapteyn (1999) describe in more detai l  the information about  household income and i ts  components
which is available in the SEP. This study also indicates how the variable ‘household disposable income’ is
constructed.  This  household income measure has also been used in this paper.
2 However,  from 1990 onwards,  only one household member (the head of the household) reports the value of housing
related assets and l iabil i t ies i .e.  1) the value of the primary residence, 2) remaining mortgage debt,  3) l ife insurance
mortgage).  In most  other wealth surveys only one household member has to f i l l  in the questionnaire.  There are pros
and cons of the approach adopted in the SEP.  I t  i s  rather unlikely that  the main respondent (head of household) has
a full knowledge of all asset items held by the members of the household. This problem is especially relevant for
those households whose head and spouse keep their fmancial administration separate. Therefore, Statistics
Netherlands has decided to interview all  respondents.  A disadvantage of the “SEP approach” is  that  for instance the
balance of joint  checking and saving accounts can be reported both by the head of the household and/or his  spouse.
In that case, there is  a  problem of double counting. However, the S E P  quest ionnaire  expl ici t ly  indicates  that  in  case
of joint  ownership of  some asset  and l iabi l i ty i tems,  only one repondent  should report  i ts ,  preferably the head of the
household .
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made between the ownership of a particular asset or liability on the one hand, and the value of
the asset and liability on the other. Information is collected for the following assets31  (1) checking
accounts; (2) savings and deposit accounts4;  (3) saving certificates (certificates of deposit); (4)
bonds, mortgage bonds; (5) shares, mutual funds, options, and other securities; (6) value of the
primary residence; (7) other real estate (not used for own residence); (8) value of the car(s); (9)
net worth of own company (for the self-employed); (10) life insurance mortgage5;  (11) other life
insurance with a saving element6 (starting date of the insurance, insurance premium); (12) other
assets. These assets are reported at the current market value. From the 1990 wave onwards, no
information has been collected on the following asset items: ‘other life insurance with a saving
element’ and ‘net worth of the own company’ (as of 1990, self-employed respondents do not
have to report their asset and liability holdings). Notice also that the SEP does not contain
information on cash holdings and on occupational pension wealth.
The surveys collect information on the liabilities of every respondent. Unfortunately, Statistics
Netherlands revises the questions and liabilities regularly. This could limit the comparability of
the liability data between years. In the SEP questionnaire of April 1987 and April 1988, the
’ The April 1987 and 1988 questionnaires also contain questions concerning the following asset category: Claims
against private persons (friends,  acquaintances).  Moreover,  in all  waves information has been collected on tangibles
(paintings,  jewelry etc.). However,  Alessie and Zandvliet  (1993) point  out  tha t  th is  informat ion is  of  dubious  qual i ty .
They have analyzed changes in ownership status over time of this asset category. Their analysis shows that
implausibly many changes in ownership are reported. For instance, it appears that from the 1277 households
reporting ownership of tangibles for 1987 and/or 1988, only 781 households have some tangibles in both years.
Given these implausible resul ts  we have decided not  to use the information on tangibles.
4 We assume that the respondents include the balance on their dedicated saving accounts when they answer the
question on the total balance of all their saving accounts. Notice that we cannot distinguish the balance of the
dedicated saving accounts from the balance of the other saving accounts.  However,  we know whether the household
has dedicated saving accounts and we know the yearly contribution to these saving accounts.  What we unfortunately
do not observe,  is  the yearly withdrawal from the saving accounts.
5 A special  type of mortgage is  possible in the Netherlands when buying a  house.  With this  mortgage contract ,  the
mortgage debt remains constant during the contract  period.  The mortgage-holder pays l ife insurance prernia  and, at
the end of the contract period, the value of the l ife insurance policy is used to redeem the mortgage. The cash value
of the l ife insurance mortgage is  not  directly observed.  However,  we have imputed this  value using the information
provided in the survey (the start ing date of the insurance,  the balance of the mortgage,  and assuming an interest  rate
of 3 percent  on a 30 year maturi ty) .  I t  should be noted that  only the 1990 wave does not  contain enough information
to impute the cash value of the l ife insurance mortgage.  We have at tempted to remedy this  problem by merging into
the 1990 dataset  some relevant information from the 199 1 wave.
6 As already noted by Alessie and Zandvliet  (1993) the questions about the other l ife insurances are rather messy .
Only information on the (yearly) premium and the year when the insurance policy is effected, has been collected.
Moreover,  no clear dist inction has been made between whole l ife insurance policies and (single premium) annuity
insurance pol icies .  Given the information at  hand,  i t  is  impossible  to come up with a reasonable estimate for the cash
value of the other life insurance policies (see also Alessie, Pradhan and Zandvliet (1993). Therefore we have not (L
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following categories are listed: (1) personal loan and revolving credit; (2) purchase on credit, hire
purchase; (3) remaining mortgage debt; (4) other loans; (5) debt not already mentioned. In 1989
ten liabilities categories have been distinguished. They are as follows: (1) personal loans; (2)
revolving credit; (3) debt with mail orders, retail debt; (4) other purchases on credit; (5) hire-
purchase; (6) remaining mortgage debt; (7) collateral-based loans; (8) debt with relatives and
friends; (9) other outstanding debt, unpaid bills; (10) debt not already mentioned. In 1990 and
199 1, the SEP distinguishes the following liability categories: (1) personal loans and revolving
credit; (2) debt with mail orders, retail debt; (3) hire-purchase, other purchases on credit,
collateral-based loans; (4) debt with relatives and friends; (5) remaining mortgage debt; (6) loans
not already mentioned. In 1992, Statistics Netherlands has used the following liability
categorization:  (1) personal loans and revolving credit; (2) debt with mail orders, retail debt; (3)
hire-purchase; (4) other purchases on credit; (5) collateral-based loans; (6) debt with relatives and
friends; (7) remaining mortgage debt; (8) other loans. From 1993 on, Statistics Netherlands has
used the following liability categories: (1) personal loans and revolving credit; (2) debt with mail
orders, retail debt; (3) hire-purchase, other purchases on credit; (4) collateral-based loans; (5)
(interest bearing) student loans (6) debt with relatives and friends; (7) remaining: mor&arre  debt:
(8)  other loans.
From the May 1990 wave onwards, the questions on assets and
anymore to self-employed. It appeared that the data on business equity,
in the April 1987, 1988 and 1989 waves of the SEP, is rather unreliable (see also Alessie, Lusardi
liabilities are not asked
which has been collected
and Aldershof (1997a)  and Alessie and Zandvliet (1993)). Therefore we have deleted the self-
employed from our sample. Household assets and liabilities are obtained by summing all the
assets (except the asset items ‘business equity’ and ‘other life insurance with a saving element’)
and liabilities of each respondent in the household. Net worth is obtained by subtracting total
liabilities from total assets. In this study we also analyze  financial wealth holdings. Financial
wealth has been defined as the difference between net worth on the one hand and housing equity
(value of the primary residence plus life insurance mortgage minus remaining mortgage debt),
other real estate and the value of the cars on the other hand.
For confidentiality reasons, the values of all asset and liability items have been top-coded for
each category and set at the value of NLG 999,997 if the values exceed that amount.7 Note,
included this  asset  i tem in  our measure of net  worth.
7 From 1990 onwards, the wealth items ‘value of the primary residence’ and ‘remaining mortgage debt’ have been Y”
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size and ownership of assets and liabilities. Non-responses are of two types: “refuse to answer”
and “do not know”. Most respondents were prepared to answer the question concerning
ownership properly. Alessie, Lusardi and Aldershof (1997a) report that a sizable fraction of
respondents refused to report or did not know the amount held in certain assets, such as
(mortgage) bonds, savings certificates, other real estate and shares, options and other securities.*
In the 1996 wave these fractions are smaller for most asset categories (this remark especially
applies to the categories ‘shares, options and other securities’ and ‘other red estate’). The panel
feature of the SEP has been exploited to impute some of the missing values. For example, in the
case of a missing value in the house value in period t, a value equal to the average of period t-l
and t+ 1 has been imputed, if the household lived in the same house in periods, t-l, t, and t+l. See
Camphuis (1993) for details.
To calculate net worth at the household level, we have chosen the following criteria (this
refers to the data after imputation has been effected): we exclude those observations for which
(i) the head of the household or the spouse “refuses to answer” one or more questions about their
assets or debts; or (ii) at least one respondent answers with “do not know” to one or more
questions about his/her assets and debt. After removing the self-employed from the sample, it is
possible to calculate net worth for approximately 90% of the households in 1987 (4,154 out of
4,531 households) and for about 95% of the households in 1988 and 1989 (4,287 out of 4,538
in 1988, and 4,410 out of 4,712 in 1989). These samples show some evidence of selectivity (see
Alessie, Lusardi and Aldershof (1997a)). From 1990 on, item non-response seems to be less of
a problem: net worth can be measured for more than 95% of the households. It appears that item
non-response is especially relevant for saving and checking accounts. No attempts have been
made to impute the missing values,
For an external validation of our survey data, we want to compare ownership rates with rates
derived from other sources. In the Dutch Flow of Funds (national) accounts data, the stock of
wealth (and its composition) is not observed. We do, however, compare the data in our panel
with statistics on the distribution and composition of household wealth published by Statistics
top coded at a value of NLG. 9,999,997.  A Dutch Guilder (NLG) is approximately equal to US$ SO.
8 Unlike the SCF, PSID and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the SEP does not include so-called bracket (,-
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Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 1996, 1997, 1998),  which are derived mainly from the IPS
data set. The IPS contains administrative data on about 75,000 households collected by Statistics
Netherlands, providing information on asset and debts from the wealth and income tax records.
This micro data set itself is not available to us. However, Statistics Netherlands annually
publishes statistics on the wealth distribution and composition of Dutch households’ based on
the IPS supplemented with some information from the SEP. Although the IPS is based upon a
large number of observations and administrative records, it is not guaranteed that the published
data perfectly reflect national ownership rates or aggregate amounts held. Underreporting to
avoid paying taxes might be as serious as measurement errors in surveys. For this reason,
Statistics Netherlands has adjusted the IPS information on the value of the primary residence by
making use of the SEP.‘* On the other hand, banks and other financial institutions are obliged
to provide the tax authorities with details on the clients’ saving accounts balances, the remaining
mortgage debt (plus the mortgage interest payments), and on interest and dividends paid out. This
obligation implies that these asset items should be measured rather accurately in the IPS. The
aggregation level in IPS is rather high, and not all the assets are covered (e.g. life insurance
policies, tangibles, cars and other durables). For instance, the IPS does not contain information
on any type of life insurance. To combine IPS  with SEP, several ad hoc approximations had to
be made. ’ r
In table 1, we compare the IPS  and SEP survey concerning some relevant asset items the
ownership rates and the mean (conditional upon ownership). This comparison which refers to the
year 1995, is rather limited, however, for several reasons. The most important reason is that contrary
to the SEP the IPS figures include the wealth holdings of the self-employed. Moreover, it is not
entirely clear whether in table 1 the item ‘other assets’ is defined in the same way in the SEP and
IPS. Keeping these caveats in mind, one can draw the following conclusions from table 1:
l The ownership rates of most asset items are roughly similar between the two datasets  although
the SEP figures suggest a higher home ownership rate than IPS. It should be mentioned that the
SEP figure almost coincides with that of the Housing Needs Survey (this is also a large-scale
quest ions in order  to al leviate the problem of i tem-nonresponse.
9 These s tat is t ics  are published in various issues of  Sociaal  Economische Maandstat is t iek,  Stat is t ics  Netherlands
, Voorburg/Heerlen.
10 Alessie, Pradhan and Zandvliet (1993) have compared the SEP data on home ownership and the value of the
primary residence with data of the Netherlands Association of Real Estate Agents (Nederlandse  Vereniging  van
MakeZaars  (NVM)). From these comparisons they conclude that the quality of the SEP of the houses owned is
adequate. d,
11 For details, see Meuwissen (1994).
1
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survey conducted by Statistics Netherlands). We don’t understand why the IPS figure is lower.
l If one takes the IPS figures as the reference point, the SEP underestimates average net worth
by 20%. A part of this underestimation has been caused by the fact that the SEP does not
observe the wealth holding of the self-employed. However, table 1 also strongly suggests that
stock and bond holdings are severely underreported in the SEP.‘” One should keep in mind that
the IPS figure on stock and bond holdings includes stocks from a substantial holding in a
c~rnpany’~  Typically, these stocks are not listed on the Dutch exchange. Given the way the SEP
question on stock holdings has been phrased, we suspect that especially the stocks from a
substantial holding in a company are severely underreported by the SEP respondents. Finally,
the underestimation of average net worth is also partly due to the fact that in the SEP checking
and saving accounts balances are underreported.
l The SEP underestimates the average amount of consumer credit considerably. On the other
hand, the SEP might overestimate the holdings in other real estate. One should realize that these
differences barely explain the difference in the estimated average net worth holdings as
observed in the SEP and IPS.
In table 2 we compare the IPS decile  distribution of net worth with that of the SEP. It appears
that the lower deciles  (until 80%) are rather precisely estimated by the SEP. The reader should
realize that the IPS  wealth data of the low-income households are based on the SEP. This
probably explains the similarity of the two wealth distributions. The 90%-  and especially 95%-
quantiles are severely underestimated. Similar although less dramatic results have been found by
Juster, Smith and Stafford (1998),  who have compared the wealth figures of the PSID  with those
of the SCF. They conclude that the underestimation is partly due to differences in the sampling
frame of the PSID (basically a representative sample) and the SCF (high-income households
oversampled).
12 Just recently, Statistics Netherlands published the National Accounts of the year 1998. For the first time, the
National  Accounts include the Flows of Funds Statement for the sector ‘households’.  Up to now, we were not  able
to obtain the NA publicat ions.  From private conversat ions with mr.  Kusters  of  the Netherlands Bureau of  Economic
Analysis  i t  became clear  that  even in the IPS the average value of  stock holdings might be underest imated.
13 In the note ‘Taxation in the Netherlands’ of the ministry of Finance (see http://www.rninfin.nl)  the term income
from a substantial holding in a company is described as follows: a taxpayer is regarded as having a substantial
holding in a corporation if he or she, either alone or with his or her spouse, holds directly or indirectly 5% of the
issued capital. If the corporation has issued different classes of shares, a substantial holding also exists if the
taxpayer, either alone or with his or her spouse, holds more than 5% of the issued capital of a particular class of
shares.  If  the taxpayer holds a substantial  interest  in a corporation,  jouissance rights and debt-claims issued by that
corporation and held directly or indirectly by the taxpayer, either alone or with his or her spouse, are regarded as - l ,
3. Wealth inequality
The primary goal of this section is to examine trends in the cross-sectional distribution of net
worth and financial wealth. Table 3 summarizes the percentile distribution of net worth for the
years 1987 through 1996. All values are expressed in 1987 prices. In all years, the distribution
of net worth is clearly right-skewed and very dispersed. In all years, about 10% of the households
have negative or zero wealth whereas the 90% decile increased from NLG 156,000 in 1987 to
NLG  267,000 in 1996. The relative increase in the median, sixth and seventh decile is even more
striking: in 1987 mean net: worth is almost equal to the seventh decile. However, in 1996 mean
net worth is considerably smaller than the seventh decile. Moreover, from table 3 it can be
inferred that between 1987 and 1996 the coefficient of variation (CV) decreased from 1.88 to
1.57. These results suggest that in contrast with the United States wealth inequality decreased in
the Netherlands between 1987 and 1996.
The question why the wealth distribution has become more equal is difficult to answer. In
table 4 and figure 1 we present some evidence which partly explains the phenomenon of the
decreasing wealth inequality. Table 4 presents the trends in the household ownership rates of
several asset and liability components. Between 1987 and 1996 the home ownership rate rose
considerably from 42.7% to 50.5%. In the same period, we observe a similar striking trend in the
ownership rate of stocks (5.8% in 1987 and 13.2% in 1996). Figure 1 summarizes the evolution
over time of the average price of the houses sold (source: Netherlands Association of Real Estate
Agents). It appears that between 1987 and 1996 the average price rose from NLG 153,000 to
NLG 262,000. The trend in the home ownership rate and the house prices might explain why
median net worth has increased so much between 1987 and 1996. For the median household the
share of housing equity in total net worth is considerably larger (especially in 1996) than for
households in the top decile in the wealth distribution. In other words, the increase in the house
prices is relatively less important for the rich than for the median household, which in turn might
explain the decreasing tendency in the wealth inequality between 1987 and 1996. In order to back
up this claim, we also present in table 5 the percentile distribution of financial wealth. This figure
does not show a negative trend in financial wealth inequality: between 1987 and 1996: the third
through nine& decile rose roughly by the same rate. Like net worth, the distribution of financial
forming par t  of  the  substant ia l  holding.
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wealth is right-skewed and very dispersed.
Some other conclusions can be drawn from table 5. The most striking one is that the value of
median wealth (NLG 7500 in 1987 prices and NL 9200 in 1996 prices) is low especially in
comparison with the United States. However, Jappelli and Pistaferri (1999) also report a rather
but somewhat higher number for median financial wealth in Italy (in terms of Dutch guilders:
NLG 16,200). However, in contrast with our financial wealth measure, they include the cash
values of life insurance and of defined contribution pension plans and ‘foreign assets’. Moreover,
contrary to us Jappelli and Pistafferri do not subtract consumer credit from their financial wealth
measure. Finally, Jappelli and Pistafferri (1999) have included the self-employed (Compared with
the Netherlands relatively much more people are self-employed in Italy). The fact that median
wealth is rather low might be due to the fact that in the Netherlands most employees are covered
by a rather extensive social security and occupational pension system. In section 5 we will pay
more attention to this issue.
4. The age-wealth and the income-wealth profiles
Tables 6 and 7 summarize for the year 1996 the age gradient of the distribution of net worth
and financial wealth respectively. Table 6 shows that there exists a clear hump-shaped age profile
for median net worth with a peak in the age range 50-54. In comparison with households in their
middle ages median net worth is rather low for the young and old households. One can also observe
a hump-shaped pattern in the age profile of average net worth with a peak around age 55. Notice,
however, that after age 55 average net worth decreases at a much slower pace than median net
worth. From table 6 one can compute the interquartile distance ((~75,p25)/p50)  and other inequality
measures (e.g. (p90mp10)/p50).  These inequality measures clearly suggest that, among the old,
wealth inequality is much greater than among the young. Contrary to net worth, we do not observe
a clear hump-shaped age pattern in median and average financial wealth.
From table 6 one could be tempted to conclude that people dissave after retirement as the
standard life cycle model predicts. However, in one cross-section, one cannot disentangle age and
cohort effects. Therefore we exploit in figures 2a and 2b the longitudinal feature of the SEP. In
these figures, we plot median and mean net worth from 1987 to 1996 for each 5-year-of-birth-
cohort. For clarity, the graphs only indicate the average year when the head of the household was
born (for example, “38” refers to heads of households born between 1936 and 1940). The vertical :t
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difference between lines measures the “cohort-time” effect. The difference along the same line
measures the “age-time” effect l4
The figures show that there are substantial cohort-time effects as well as age-time effects in
total net worth. Within the same cohort, both mean and median net worth are steadily increasing
over time. This is particularly true for the young cohorts, but even for some elderly mean net
worth continues to increase over time (median net worth remains fairly constant for the old
cohorts)‘? The increase in mean total net worth over the lo-year period is for 1936-1940 cohort
as big as NLG 100,000. The fact that mean and median net worth increase for most cohorts
(except the old ones) in a “parallel” way suggests, that time effects may also be important. This
effect may be due, for example, to common macro shocks, changes in housing prices and the
increase in home ownership rates (see table 4 and figure 1). i6 While important, home-ownership
is; however, not solely responsible for the existence of cohort-time effects in total net worth. In
Figures 3a and 3b we report financial wealth and show that strong cohort-time effects are still
present in the mean and median of this more restrictive measure of wealth.
Figures 2a and 2b clearly show that on the basis of cross-section evidence (e.g. table 6) one
cannot answer the question whether or not people dissave after retirement. In contrast with table
6, the figures suggest that the elderly do not dissave. On the basis of figure 2a one can also infer
that the cross-section age profile of net worth of the year 1996 is much more hump-shaped than
that of 1987. These results underline the problem associated with testing the predictions of the
life-cycle model using cross-section data.
Examining the wealth distribution by income deciles allows one to assess if households in the
top quantiles of the income distribution also fall in the top quantiles of the wealth distribution.
We report therefore within each decile  of the household income distribution the distribution of
net worth and financial wealth (see tables 8 and 9). Both mean and median wealth increases with
the rank in the income distribution, implying a strong correlation in the relative positions in the
I4 We use this  terminology to
these figures.  See also below.
emphasize that it is not possible to disentangle age from cohort and time effects in
l5  The age-time effects of the old cohorts (especially the cohort 19104915) should be interpreted with care
because the estimate of the age-time could be biased for reasons of differential mortality: survival probabilities
may be posit ively correlated wi th  wealth implying that  r ich households are over-represented in  the oldest
cohorts. This correlation implies that one may find a low rate of decumulation after retirement simply because
the poor tend to disappear from the sample earlier than the rich.
”  There is another potential cause for the existence of these time effects. It is possible that the amount of
measurement error, and particularly under-reporting of wealth, is decreasing over time. (,.
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two distributions.
5 Why Do Households Say They Save? I7
The questionnaires of the 1987 and 1988. waves of the SEP also list several possibilities for
motives to save and asks the respondent to consider one or several combinations of the motives
listed. The main possibilities are: to buy a house, to buy a car, to buy other durables, for unforeseen
events, for children, for old age, for no specific purpose, and all possible combinations of the above
motives. Examining the motives to save in more detail, it is interesting to note that the households
who have indicated unforeseen events alone or in combination with other motives account for 22
percent of the total sample. This result is relevant in light of recent studies of savings which
emphasize the precautionary saving motive, i.e. that people save to insure against risk. The
percentage of people who have indicated the desire to buy a house as a motive to save is 13 percent,
the percentage indicating automobile purchase is 12 percent; 15 percent have indicated the purchase
of other durables. There is a very small proportion of households, only 2 percent, indicating that
they save for old age. This is probably due to the fact that almost every employee (as well as
persons who receive unemployment or disability benefits) in the Netherlands is covered by
extensive social security and occupational pension schemes: studies of Alessie, Kapteyn and Klijn
(1997b) and Kapteyn, Alessie and Lusardi (1999) indicate that there is a considerable displacement
effect between private saving and social security wealth. This may explain the fact that the median
Dutch household holds very little (financial) wealth.
The behavior of these motives across the life cycle is presented in Figure 4. The precautionary
saving motive remains relatively stable across the life cycle, but it is somewhat greater for young
and old households. Note that this motive may capture several types of risk, not only income or
unemployment risk, but also mortality risk. It is conceivable that other types of risks than income
uncertainty are more important to explain saving behavior of Dutch households: Das en Donkers
(1999) use the CentERpanel which collects information on the subjective distribution of future
income. Their analysis shows that more than 80% of the households report a coefficient  of variation
of future income below 6.5 % (see also Jappelli and Pistafferri (1999)). This low variability in
future income is presumably caused by the tight labor regulations (it is difficult to fire employees
17 This section draws heavily on section 5.2. of Alessie, Lusardi and Aldershof (1997)
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in the Netherlands) and the generous social insurance programs in the Netherlands. The motive
related to the purchase of a house is concentrated among households below the age of 40; after age
40 this motive becomes less important. Saving for children affects the young households between
30 and 40 and is presumably related to raising children. This motive seems to be relevant for the
elderly as well, in particular for the households over the age of 70, and it is possibly related to a
bequest motive. Evidence (based on the CentERpanel,  presented in Alessie, Lusardi and Kapteyn
(1999),  suggests that the bequest motive is especially relevant for the high income households.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined wealth data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel. The survey
provides detailed information on the assets and liabilities of each household member. This
information allows one to study wealth holdings over the life cycle, portfolio choice, and wealth
inequality. From the analysis presented in this paper the following conclusions can be drawn:
l The wealth data of the SEP are of reasonable quality. The amount of individual and item-non
response is rather small. However, average stock holdings are considerably underestimated by
the SEP. Moreover, the SEP is not suitable to analyze the determinants of the wealth holdings
of the very rich.
l Between 1987 and 1996 the wealth distribution became more equal. This phenomenon can be
attributed partly to the increasing trend in the home ownership rates and the rise in house prices.
l The age- (median) wealth profile has an inverted U-shape. Between 1987 and 1996 it became
even more hump-shaped. Wealth inequality is greater among the old than among the young.
l Not surprisingly, there is a strong positive relationship between wealth and income.
The panel feature of the SEP allows the researcher to further examine household accumulation.
One can study questions such as: do the elderly dissave (see, e.g., Alessie, Lusardi and Kapteyn
(1995, and 1997) and do young people facing upward sloping earnings profiles borrow as predicted
by the theoretical models? The SEP provides information on the motives to save, making it possible
to check whether the reported answers conform to actual behavior.
The analysis of the profiles of wealth, savings, and income over the life cycle shows that there
is substantial heterogeneity in the behavior of households, which should be taken into account in
the econometric modeling. As with all survey data, there is a misreporting and measurement error <,.
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problem. This problem becomes more acute with data in first differences (i.e. savings). However,
a useful feature of this data set is the provision of many variables, which could act as instruments
and alleviate the measurement error problem in econometric analyses.
The survey covers a long time span and is continuing. This data set will enable researchers to
examine household behavior in several dimensions and should prove extremely valuable for
research and policy evaluations. However, the sample size is rather small especially if one likes to
analyze in more detail the saving and retirement behavior of the elderly. Another drawback of the
SEP is the limited information on health.
1 3
References
Alessie, Rob, Menno  Pradhan, and Christine Zandvliet, “Measurement of Household Saving
obtained from First Differencing Wealth Estimates”, VSB Progress Report n. 13, Tilburg
University, 1993.
Alessie, Rob, and Christine Zandvliet, “An Exploratory Analysis of the Socio-Economic Panel Data
with Regard to the Financial Position of Households”, VSB Progress Report n. 14, Tilburg
University, 1993.
Alessie, R., A. Lusardi, and T. Aldershof (1997a),  “Income and Wealth over the Life Cycle:
Evidence from Panel Data,” The Review of Income and Wealth, 43, 1-32.
Alessie, R., A. Kapteyn and F. Klijn (1997b),  “Mandatory pensions and personal savings in
the Netherlands”, De Economist, 145, no. 3, pp. 291-324.
Alessie, R., A. Lusardi and A. Kapteyn (1999),  “Saving after retirement: evidence based on
three different savings measures”, Labour Economics, 6, pp. 277-3 10.
Avery, R. B., G. E. Elliehausen, and A. B. Kennickell (19SS),  “Measuring Wealth with Survey
Data: An Evaluation of the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances”, The Review of Income and
Wealth, 34,339.369.
Alessie, R., and A. Kapteyn (1999),  “Savings, Pensions and Portfolio Choice in the Netherlands”,
Free University Amsterdam.
Camphuis, H. (1993),  “Checking, Editing and Imputation of Wealth Data of the Netherlands
Socio-Economic Panel for the period 87-89,” VSB Progress Report n. 10, CentER, Tilburg
University, The Netherlands.
Statistics Netherlands (1991),  Sociaal-Economisch Panelonderzoek:  Inhoud, Opzet  ey1  Organisutie,
SDU, The Hague.
1 4
Das, M. and B. Donkers (1999),  “How certain are Dutch households about future income? An
empirical analysis”, The Review of Income and Wealth, Vol. 45, pp. 325338.
Jappelli, T. and L. Pistafferri  (1999),  “The dynamics of household wealth accumulation in Italy:
measurement and distributional issues”, mimeo, University of Salerno.
Juster, T., J. Smith, and F. Stafford (1998),  “The measurement and structure of household
wealth”, mimeo, Rand Corporation.
Kapteyn, A., R. Alessie and A. Lusardi (1999),  “Explaining the wealth holdings of different
cohorts: productivity growth and social security”, mimeo, Tinbergen Institute.
Meuwissen, P.J.J. (1994),  “Het meten van vermogen via enquetes en fiscale  administraties”,
Supplement Sociaal-economische Maandstatistiek I, 17-27.
1 5
Table 1: Comparison of SEP with Income Panel Survey (IPS)
S E P IPS
%-owners Mean %-owners Mean
(NLGx (NLGx
1000) 1000)
Net worth 1 0 0 109 1 0 0 136
Gross wealth 100 163 1 0 0 192
Checking, saving accounts 100 2 2 9 9 2 9
Stocks, bonds, derivatives 1 4 6 6 1 2 231
Other real estate 5 2 1 3 4 168
Primary residence 5 0 2 4 0 4 3 2 5 5
Business equity 8 148
Other assets 8 3 2 10 / 7 4
Debts 5 8 9 2 5 5 100
Mortgage 4 3 118 3 8 125
Other debts 2 8 13 31 3 4
Source: own calculations based on the SEP and Statistics Netherlands (IF’S numbers)
Table 2:Comparison of the SEP and IPS  percentile distributions of wealth in 1995 (wealth x 1000)  1
Source p10  p20  p30 p40  p50  p60  p70 p80  p90 p95  M e a n ( N L G
x 1000)
S E P - 1 2 6 16, 3 8 7 6 1 2 6 189 2 8 4 4 1 7 109
IPS -2 1 5 13’ 31 6 9 120 192 3 2 6 5 2 8 136
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Figure 2a: Median net worth by age and cohort
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Figure 2b: Mean net worth by age and cohort
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Figure 3b: Mean financial wealth by age and cohort
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Figure 4: Saving motives across age
Source: Alessie, Lusardi and Aldershof (1997)
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ITable  3: Trends in the decile  distribution of net worth (in 1987 mites) I
/
J?70 p80 p90 Mean (NLG) Std. dev.Year N o b s DlO D20 P30 D40 D50 ~60
1987  1 40211  -1050(  15191 47351 98001 17050 3 0 0 0 0 560891 950561 1555421 561501 1043451
‘1988  1 4191(  -3471 16861 48611101291 18849 3 3 4 3 2 595221 1008741 1654151 596761 1096891
1989  1 43511 -2431 18501  54681 112851 20442 35425 I 630981 1075091 1761251 648111  1205051
4 0 9 8 5 701181 1144531 1883331 697731 12590311990 4392 1 1921 5 8 0 3 12429 23322
1991 4127 471  2741 7 2 9 6 14625 2 5 7 5 4 4 6 8 1 5 750431 1227651 1998501 739601 1279401
~ lg92  r4384i ij 24071  716iip~~ 2 7 2 9 7 4 7 4 3 4 814431 1294931 2013021 756221 1325231
5 8 1 8 8 95465 ( 1434781 2180601 85151[  141032111993 4 2 5 7 2 0 9 3 4 9 8 8 7 9 8 18716 3 4 3 3 6
‘1994 4331 0 3 1 0 6 8585 19320 3 8 4 9 3 6 8 0 5 3 1051351 1562591 2433841 962391 2353201
1995 1 42351  1511 31491 88991 202461 42847 I 7 7 3 6 2 1213011 1709791 2615251 1009951 1562621
1996143051 -201  29091 88171  -- - 205721  43078 8 1 4 2 6 1242991 1803091 2669471 1033701 1668011
21
Table 3 (continued): Trends in the decile  distribution of net worth
Year Nobs pl P5 PI0 P50 P90 P 9 5 P 9 9 Mean (NLG) std. dev.
40211 -255001 -66181 -10501 170501 1555421 2198381 4760001 561501 104345
1988 I 41911 -265871 -52781 -3471 188491 1654151 2331291 4970121 5 9 6 7 6 109689
1989 4351 -21098 -4203 -243 2 0 4 4 2 176125 2 5 4 1 5 7 5 3 9 0 2 8 64811 120505
1990 4392 -18834 -3170 1 23322 188333 2 7 4 4 1 5 5 7 0 5 3 8 6 9 7 7 3 125903
1991 41271 -22721 257541 1998501 2855211 5691831 739601 127940
1992 I 43841 -213681 -34011  0) 27297 1 2013021 2914931 5808381 756221 132523
1993 4 2 5 7 -14124 -2055 2 0 9 34336 2 1 8 0 6 0 3 1 3 9 6 8 6 2 1 3 7 6 85lil 141032
1994 4331 -17405 -3337 0 3 8 4 9 3 2 4 3 3 8 4 3 4 6 0 6 3 6 6 6 2 3 6 9 6 2 3 9 2 3 5 3 2 0
1995 I 42351 -160621 -28811 1511 428471 2615251 3595191 695487 ( 1009951 156262
1996 I 43051 -199891 -37531 -201 430781 2669471 3695921 7347781 1033701 166801
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Table 4: Ownership rates of asset components
Total sample
Net worth
Gross wealth
Financial assets
With banks
Checking accounts
Saving accounts, saving certificates
Stocks, bonds, derivatives
Bonds
stocks, options
Real estate
own house
other real estate
Other assets
Debts
Mortgage
Other debts
N o b s
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
99.7 99.7 99.8 99.3 99.7 99.6
99.5 9 9 . 6 99.6 99.1 99.4 99.5
99.3 99.5 9 9 . 6 98.8 99.3
99.1 99.5 9 9 . 4 98.3 98.5
65.9 6 9 . 0 7 0 . 9 68.9 74.9
76  . 82  . 8.9 10.0 11.4
28  . 35  . 36. 35. 43.
58  . 62  . 71 . 81. 88.
4 4 . 0 4 3 . 5 44.3 45.1 4 5 . 9
4 2 . 7 42.5 43.5 4 4 . 4 45.1
4 6  . 43  . 4 2. 38. 4 0.
10.3 10.0 6 . 9 6.8 8.4
99.3
98.9
7 6 . 6
11.7
36.
97.
4 5 . 6
4 4 . 8
4 2.
83.
54.1 52.7 55.5 53.1 53.4
3 6 . 0 35.7 3 7 . 0 37.2 3 7 . 4
29.7 28.5 32.2 27.6 27.7
4 0 3 9 .4207 4 3 7 9 4 4 3 2 4 1 3 0
2 3
54.1 5 3 . 6 57.5 5 8 . 0 59.5
37.6 39.7 4 0 . 9 4 2 . 7 4 3 . 7
2 8 . 0 26.4 29.7 27.5 28.1
4 4 0 1 4 2 6 7 4 3 5 3 4251 4 3 2 5
99.9 99.9
99.7 99.7
99.7 99.6
99.6 99.4
7 7 . 4 78.3
12.4 13.4
41  . 4 0  .
10.1 11.3
4 8 . 4 4 9 . 2
47.1 4 8 . 0
4 6  . 4 4  .
79  . 83 .
99.9 99.8
99.7 99.7
99.7
99.6
77.7
14.0
4 2.
11.6
50.9
4 9 . 7
4 8.
7 6.
99.7
99.6
77.7
15.2
37.
13.2
51.1
50.5
4 0.
10.2
lITable  5: trends in the decile distribution of financial wealth I I
year nobs p10  p20  p30  p40  p50  p60  ( p70  p80  p90  Mean std.
( N L G d e v  .
>
1987 4021 -5630 -121 1019 2300 4193 665710141165403300014218 5 2 6 4 7
1988 4191 -5357 0 1190 24804445 704811308189563749915550 5 7 7 7 9
19894351-5593 -294 981 2458 4416 736011776193223935017157 6 3 2 0 9
1990 4392 -4851 1 1085 2582 4858 8164132022157444663 18694 6 5 9 5 9
19914127 -3999 9 5 1674 3488 6045 948115811258555208221750 6 6 0 7 5
1992 4384 -4784 0 1342 3270 5817 9755 16110270285593620879 6 5 8 6 2
1993 4257 -4778 109 1662 3748 6647107191696628423 56073 21867 6 6 4 4 7
19944331-5775 -84 1529 3822 68461120418343297235940324021 71412
1995 4235 -4769 6 0 1671 4161 72401165118850311535979024917 72932
1996 4305 -5058 0 16644079,750611683  1972931989.6477224977 7 0 7 3 5 ,
liTable  5 (continued): trends in the decile distribution of financial wealth II
year / nobs 1 pl / p5  1 p10  / p50  1 p90  / p9TP/sG
19871  40211-255001  -66181 -56301  41931 33000~2198~6000
19881 41911-265871 -52781 -53571 44451 374991233129l497012
19891 43511-210981  -42031 -55931 44161 393501254157~539028
19901  43921-188341 -31701 -48511 48581 4466312744151570538
19911  41271-154391  -22721 -39991 60451  5208212855211569183
19921  43841-213681  -34011 -47841 58171  5593612914931580838
19931 42571-141241 -20551  -47781 66471 5607313139681621376
19941 43311-174051 -33371 -57751 68461 5940313460631666236
19951 42351-160621  -28811  -47691 72401  597901359519w
1996 4305 -19989 -3753 -5058 7506 64772369592734778 249771 70735
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I Table 6: distribution of net worth bv age in 1996 I
age group
c25
,25029
I 30-34 I 444 I 168 I 11100 I 63541 I 154423 I 2693 10 I 102825
Nobs p10 p25 p50 p 7 5 p90 Mean (NLG)
236 -6450 -300 2741 10220 24665 9729
,374 I-8500 ,100 ,16813 ,61771 1132300 ,43036
I 35-39 I 5 1 0 I 400 I 13500 I 104182 I 208322 1321046 7138450
I 40-44 I 5 1 8 I 463 I 19661 I 112774 I 217811 I 364013 I 150295
I 45-49 I 439 I 400 I 16096 I 104487 I 231328 I 347343 I 149762
I 50-54 I 348 I 308 I 27199 I 153185 I 281623 I 4 2 7 1 0 0 I 199132
I 55-59 I 271 I 559 I 15252 I 126000 I 280500 1456862 7210879
(60-64 I 662 1900 I9039 176088 l25ObOO I453000 I170597
I 65-69 I 3 1 5 I 989 I 6882 I 44000 I 2 2 1 9 3 2 7401790 (152109
I 70-74 I 245 I 2200 I 10000 I 29000 I 222000 I 4 1 6 1 6 3 I 145089
I 75-79 I 187 I 775 I 4 0 1 4 I 15500 I 9 9 5 9 5 I 3 1 0 0 0 0 I 9 9 7 1 2
I 80+ I 153 I 1500 I 4354 I 14000 I 136327 I 472000 I 133853
I Total I4306 0I I 7000 I 55509 I 197297 I 340785 I 132992
‘std. dev
32838
7 2 9 2 3
'139469
~166649 I
EE-i- -.
~314402 I
314631 I
248677 I
22923 1
226039 I
208840 I
25
Table 7: The distribution of financial wealth by age in 1996
age group N o b s
~25 2 3 6
PlO
-8500
P25
-2028
P50
1350
P75
5100
P90
13775
Mean
(NW
2306
std. dev
12383
125-29 1374 l-14239 I-3688 13500 t 16900 138000 19514 141)037 I
I 30-34 I 4 4 4 I -9899 I 3 0 5 I 6500 I 2 3 7 3 5 I 5 3 5 8 0 I 16729
T
35-39 5 1 0 -7415 5 0 0 9 1 6 2 26041 65701 25870 7 8 6 5 1I
40-44 5 1 8 -7200 40 ‘; 19072 128433 159000 160645
145-49 I  94 3 I-8982 1 65 8 19520 131707 I 7 4 1 2 5 I 72254 1
I 50-54 I I3 4 8 I I I I I I 1-9700 9 7 2 Pd I13995 144387 1109927 134004 166772 I
I 55-59 I 271 I -6000 I 1oc )O I 15299 I 51600 126400 I 5937 1 1172858 1
60-64 I 2 6 6 I -263 I 2 6 7 9 I 14482 I 5 1 7 9 5 I 121900 I 4 0 9 8 8 181i4m
65-69 I 3 1 5 I 3 0 0 I 2781 I 12695 I 43000 I 100658 I45304 -- 105891
70-74 2 4 5 7 2 2 5 8 5 3 17800 44000 149970 56258- 112313
75-79 187 5 0 0 2 5 8 8 10342 40000 7 4 1 9 6 3553 1 87085
80+ 153 1500 4100 12000 41000 171900 61086 137936
Total 4306 -6200 9 7 2 9200 3 0 5 0 0 79760 3 0 6 4 6 .86715
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Table 8: distribution of net worth by deciles  of the income distribution in 1996
Decile nobs DlO I325 P50 075 D90 Mean CNLG)  std. dev
I inc<17943 I 411 I-4500 lo l-120 I - 4 5 0 0 I 52005 I 5 0 4 I 106571
I 17943cinc<=24255 I 4 1 0 I-2981  1800  16521 (26355 (159525 (44106  ~~~ E%i?---i
24255cinc<=30623 4 1 1 -2056 1600 10367 41100 185000 5 1 9 8 7 108190
30623<incc=37337 4 1 0 -1137 6100 2 4 1 7 5 101998 2 6 7 7 0 0 8 0 2 8 6 128071
I 37337<inc<=44205 I 411 I 1852 I 12514 I 5 7 7 0 2 I 187642 I 3 0 4 1 2 7 I 121953 I 166968 I
I 44205cinc<=5  1960 I 410 -964I I 13404 I 7 1 9 2 3 I 175500 I 2 7 4 8 7 5 I 113716 I 133757 1
I 5 1960cinc<=59  139 I 411 I 8 7 0 0 I 31548 I 109518 I 2 1 8 7 1 7 I 3 2 6 3 9 0 I 164309 12876871
I 59139<inc<=68192 I 4 1 0 114820  152948 1129268 1242355 1382767 1174417 t 1 7 2 4 8 1
68192<incc=81525 411 3 1 0 0 0 8 5 0 1 2 158471 2 7 1 5 7 5 401790 2 0 1 4 2 2 171681
in081525 4 1 0 52452 127300 2 3 1 5 3 8 3 7 0 7 7 6 6 3 6 0 2 9 3 2 0 1 2 0 3 3 5 4 9 6
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Table 9: distrbution of financial wealth by deciles of the income distribution in 1996
Decile nobs p10 p25 p50 p 7 5 p90 Mean (NLG) std. dev
Inc<17943 411 -5700 0 -366 5 5 5 7 15000 5 0 4 3 8 6 2 7
17943cincc=24255 4 1 0 -3753 3 1 0 3 1 7 4 12100 3 4 9 5 8 12748 3 5 4 8 3
I 24255cinc<=30623 I 411 I -4745 I 2 6 1 I 5 1 7 5 I 16983 I 3 9 1 0 0 I 13051 I 3 7 0 0 4 II 4
30623<inc<=37337 4 1 0 -7797 9 0 0 7 9 6 7 28686 6 0 2 8 8 2 1 5 9 6 4 4 3 6 8
37337cinc<=44205 411 -7225 2 2 5 8 9 4 2 9 28000 6 6 5 0 0 27191 77910
44205<inc<=S  1960 4 1 0 -11828 -833 7 4 9 9 31551 58561 19680 4 2 8 2 3
51960cinc<=59139 411 -528 1 3 7 9 3 12698 36022 84598 3 2 0 6 2 7 6 0 3 9
59139<inc<=68192 4 1 0 -7616 4607 16472 39100 8 7 3 5 6 3 3 4 3 4 7 2 4 7 41 I
68 192<inc<=8 *1525 4 1 1 -1899 6270 2 0 8 0 0 4 9 8 8 7 112063 44327 79711
I~>81525 4 1 0 -8459 9600 3 7 3 8 2 97000 232835 9 3 9 2 2 j 190009
2 8
